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Country Focus – France  
Helen Drake, Loughborough University1 
Flawed democracy? 
For three years running, in 2011, 2012 and 2013,  France has been branded a 
‘flawed’ democracy by the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index.  A key 
reason for the verdict is the ‘erosion of sovereignty and democratic accountability 
associated with the effects of and responses to the euro zone crisis’ (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2011).  Addressing the urgency of economic recovery without 
losing its footing over the next two years is the French government’s challenge, and 
in this article I explore the immediate and longer-term dimensions of this situation. 
The present difficulty for the French socialist government is to steer the economy – 
habitually measured as the fifth largest in the world – towards the austere fiscal 
targets set in conjunction with the European Commission at a time of stubbornly 
high unemployment (the jobless figure is expected to remain over 10% by the end of 
2015). The deal reached with the EU was to reduce the public deficit to 3% and the 
public debt to 60% of GDP in the same time frame.  All indications are that the deficit 
will not be brought under control this far and this fast and, since the current rules of 
EU governance are stringent and intrusive, this failure will be very public, and can be 
expected to further weaken political support for austerity politics at home. 
No confidence 
This ever diminishing autonomy in fiscal affairs already cost the French Prime 
Minister Manuel Valls his first government. In August 2014, after only 147 days in 
office and in response to a very public rebuke by his Minister for the Economy and 
Productive Recovery, Arnaud Montebourg, over the austerity measures in train, Valls 
sacked Montebourg and other detractors from the cabinet, and put a newly-
assembled government to a vote of confidence in the  French National Assembly on 
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political legitimacy for the government to make its next round of cuts to public 
expenditure and subsequently pass its budget for 2015.   The government’s victory 
was slender (269 in favour and 244 against) and more Socialist Party deputies 
abstained than in April 2014 when Manuel Valls first took office as Prime Minister 
and put his government’s confidence to the parliamentary vote. The ruling French 
Socialist Party has thus shown itself to be divided in its approach to economic policy 
at a time when the economy remains the number one preoccupation of French 
voters.  These voters have themselves contributed to the cracks in party unity by 
declining to support the Socialist government on three separate occasions since the 
party won both the presidency and the legislature in May 2012. 
In March 2013 the municipal elections were a serious defeat for the government. 
Abstention was higher than usual (nearly 40%), the party lost control of 150 towns 
and cities, the opposition UMP (Union pour un mouvement populaire) and allies won 
a 62% majority and the Front national consolidated its gains from the previous local 
elections in 2008.  The magnitude of this defeat prompted President Hollande to 
replace his Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault with Manuel Valls, who has since 
proven himself unafraid to take the leading role more habitually associated with the 
incumbent of the Elysée.  The municipal elections return councillors to every single 
one of France’s basic unit of governance, the commune (France still has 36,000 of 
these), and in so doing constitute the electoral college that elect the upper house of 
Parliament, the Senate.  It was therefore no surprise when in September 2014 the 
elections to replace half the senatorial body also returned a majority for the 
opposition, and in so doing restored a right-wing majority to that House that had 
only been briefly troubled by three years of Socialist dominance (from 2011-2014) in 
all its history. Notably, the senatorial elections for the first time ever returned two 
National Front members, reflecting the party’s victory at the local level earlier in the 
year (and at the 2012 legislative elections the party had won two seats in the 
National Assembly, following a record 6.5m votes in the first round of the 
presidential elections of the same year). In between these two votes came the 
elections to the European Parliament in May 2014.  Fought entirely on proportional 
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representation, the result was a notable victory for the National Front which with 4.7 
million votes cast won 24 seats in the Strasbourg chamber, its largest number yet.  
Holding back the tide 
The Front national was formed in the early 1970s, came to prominence a decade 
later under the leadership of its founder, Jean-Marie le Pen, and since 2011 has seen 
its biggest successes with le Pen’s daughter, Marine le Pen, at the helm.  
Explanations for its prominence in contemporary France lie in part in the political 
culture of the country. France’s historically multiparty political system is perennially 
subject to centrifugal forces which place traditional allegiances and affiliations under 
strain. Conventions of personalised political leadership exacerbate these tensions 
and the Front national has consistently tapped these populist veins. It has also 
capitalised on unpopular presidents to challenge the institutions of the Fifth French 
Republic as well as policies towards the EU and immigration.  The presidential office, 
the pinnacle of governance in the Fifth Republic, was designed to be ambitious for 
the nation, setting the cap for a seven-year term on the basis of an absolute majority 
of the popular vote.  In its  present, five-year form it is doomed to raise expectations 
in keeping with the traditions of the office, but routinely fail to meet them. Why is 
this? First, the presidential office is increasingly brought into disrepute in a post-
deferential age where the traditional privacy of French public figures can no longer 
be realistically upheld (the exposure of President Hollande’s human frailties in book 
form- Merci pour ce moment – by his former partner Valérie Trierweiler is a trivial 
example of such developments; as were former president Sarkozy’s very public love 
lives). Second, the incumbents of the Elysée Palace have been revealed to be worldly 
to the point of corrupt. Former President Jacques Chirac (1995-2002) was found 
guilty of financial wrong-doing dating back to the years when he was Mayor of Paris; 
and Nicolas Sarkozy, president between 2007-2012 has yet to escape numerous 
different allegations of misconduct which include the financing of his 2012 election 
campaign.  In this light, Sarkozy’s decision to return to politics in time to fight the 
2017 presidential elections can be seen to be as instrumental as it is populist: he has 
promised to build a ‘mass movement’ of political support; and, in heroic leadership 
style, claims he has ‘no choice’ but to return to solve the country’s problems.  
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Third, and more substantially, the French presidency is constrained by its 360 
degrees of interdependence: there are more checks and balances in whichever 
direction the President cares to look.  Across the Seine in the seat of government at 
Matignon, Prime Minister Valls is over twice as popular as President Hollande whose 
ratings in September 2014 were a dismal 13% . Looking eastwards to Brussels, the 
ability of the President to deliver his election promises is complicated by the fiscal 
and other rules of the EU. And from all points of the compass, rules and regulations 
of international governance reach deep into traditionally sovereign political fields 
including human rights legislation and foreign policy.  This is an interdependence 
which defines France as a country open to forces of many kinds, and in French 
political language that openness is subsumed in the fear-mongering term of la 
mondialisation, or globalisation. In more recent years that term has itself come to 
operate as a proxy for other more insidious fears, notably of the imagined impact of 
France’s large Muslim population on the cohesion of the nation. For the Front 
national and other figures -  including Nicolas Sarkozy - France’s cultural 
heterogeneity is constructed as a potential threat not only to French identity, but to 
the physical security of the nation. The domestic ramifications of France’s 
involvement in fighting Islamic extremism abroad, and of its foreign interventions 
full stop (most recently in Mali and in the Central African Republic; and it was willing, 
in 2013, to also target Syria)  are real. Killers of French tourist Hervé Gourdel, 
beheaded in September 2014 by extremists in Algeria, directly linked his death to 
French participation alongside the US in military action against the Islamic State in 
Iraq. The French response to date has been to continue determinedly in what those 
it targets calls its ‘crusade’ against Islamic State, while collaborating with its allies to 
deter French citizens from fighting alongside its enemies (in Syria, for example).  
In this climate, other progressive developments in French society have met with 
significant opposition that explicitly equates them to a threat to the integrity of 
French identity. The government passed its bill to legalise same sex marriage (le 
mariage pour tous) and adoption in May 2013 and in the process unleashed a 
sustained backlash: la manif pour tous (‘all out against’: an umbrella group of groups 
formed in protest at these developments). This campaign has subsequently turned 
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its attention to reproductive rights including surrogacy and medically assisted 
procreation and, in particular, the extension of these rights beyond the traditional 
heterosexual couple + children family unit. These are aspects of society where those 
fighting for their rights can frame their claims in terms of international legal norms, 
which makes the developments all the more insidious in the eyes of their detractors.  
‘Made in France’  
Contemporary France in 2014 is far more internationalised than even ten years ago, 
and the momentum is probably unstoppable. The English language is a knowing 
badge of global identity in France’s urban environments [USE IMAGE ‘MADE IN 
FRANCE’]. French electro-pop duo Daft Punk’s English-language album Random 
Access Memories won five Grammy awards in 2014. French Prime Minister Manuel 
Valls, in London in October 2014 declared admiringly in the face of ‘French-bashing’ 
from leading UK industrialists that ‘my government is pro-business’ too, citing his 
determination to lift restrictions on Sunday trading to induce Chinese tourists to 
shop in Paris – not London - on both days of the weekend; and the ‘Responsibility 
Pact’ introduced by the government in January 2014 is designed to structure this 
pro-business emphasis in a country where by many measures, tax and regulatory 
burdens on enterprise are still crushing.  The Franco-American friendship is as 
important as ever to France. The  challenge for the country thus seems to be how to 
respond appropriately to the choices that still remain within this internationalist 
frame. A recent report commissioned by the government and written by economist 
Jean Pisani-Ferry, head of the Prime Minister’s policy planning unit, is instructive in 
this regard (Pisani-Ferry, 2014).  Drawing explicitly on scholarly literature and policy 
lessons from France’s international allies and comparators, first and foremost the 
USA and the UK, the report offers a diagnosis of the state of France in 2014 and sets 
targets for 2025 that are measurable and expressed in comparative terms: by 2025, 
for example, France should aim to achieve a 70% turnout at legislative elections; to 
be in the top third of European countries for non-discrimination on ethnic grounds;  
have 10 universities in the world rankings; to double the number of French students 
who go abroad to study; and almost double the number of international students in 
France to nearly 500,000.  
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One of the most striking features of this analysis is the enthusiasm with which it 
embraces France’s options for more openness and international success, and 
cautions against painting overly-pessimistic scenarios of France’s future.  It is true 
that intellectual blinkers inside and outside France have contributed to what Pisani-
Ferry has called ‘le catastrophisme’ (2014: 53); or what others might think of as le 
déclinisme. These are popular narratives that portray contemporary France as 
engaged on a slow path to decline and decay. This picture is defied by anecdotal and 
empirical evidence of a country in movement, and for Pisani-Ferry the slide is not 
fatal. But stopping the rot means fixing the flaws in French democracy, and holding 
the policy-making gaze firmly on the longer-term. 
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